Sudan’s Independence Day was declared in 1956 after peaceful negotiations between the Party Leaders of the two main traditional parties: Umma Party and National Unionist Party and the Anglo/Egyptian, the colonizers. It was believed that these negotiations were carried out in the absence of people of Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Darfur, Beja Hills and Ingesena. They were all excluded from the talks leading to independence of the country. However, people of South Sudan were promised a self-rule in a federal state if they were to vote for independence. Indeed, they voted for independence of Sudan but the promise was not honoured. This of course is one of the reasons that driven the people of Southern Sudan to resort to arm struggle for nearly four decades.

It seems that the history is about to repeat itself, as our political leaders are about to repeat the same mistake committed fifty years ago.

On Wednesday 26th May 2004 a significant breakthrough came, as the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement signed the final three Protocols in Naivasha on power-sharing and on resolution of conflict for the three disputed areas of Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei which proven to be the most contentious issues in the whole peace process. By so doing, the Parties believe that they had overcome the final hurdle of long hard negotiations, which the SPLA Leader, Dr. John Garang described "We have reached the crest of the last hill in our tortuous ascent to the heights of peace. There are no more hills ahead of us". This came as a result of combination of pressure from the Troika and IGAD dedication and commitment to achieve peace in Sudan.

However, this bilateral peace agreement between the National Congress Party and SPLM/A had addressed only the interest of the two Parties and excluded many of the opposition groups in the country. In fact, it had ignored the demands and the aspirations of the majority of the other stakeholders.

The Protocol on Power-Sharing revealed that there will be a National Government and a separate Government of Southern Sudan. The National Government is to be decentralized with "significant devolution of powers" awarded to each state. Dr. John Garang will be First Vice-President in the new National Government. The National Congress Party will fill 52 percent of seats in the National Assembly; the SPLM will have 28 percent; other northern political forces will have 14 percent; other southern forces 6 percent. Khartoum will remain the capital of the Republic of Sudan. Non-Muslims will not be subject to shari’a law in the capital. The rights of non-Muslims are to be protected by a special commission appointed by the President.

  On Abyei Protocol, the residents of Abyei (the Ngok and other residents) will be awarded a special administrative status" during the interim period and will remain citizens of both Western Kordofan in northern Sudan and Bahr al-Ghazal in southern Sudan with representation in the legislatures of both states. Abyei will be administered by a local Executive Council, to be elected by its residents, during the interim period. Simultaneous with the referendum on secession for southern Sudan after the interim period, residents of Abyei will have a separate referendum to decide whether to remain part of northern or southern Sudan.

Oil revenue from Abyei will be divided six ways during the interim period: between the National Government (50 percent); the Government of Southern Sudan (42 percent); Bahr al-Ghazal (2 percent); Western Kordofan (2 percent); the Ngok Dinka (2 percent); and the Misariyah (2 percent).

On the Protocol of Southern Kordofan/ Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile, the residents of the two areas will have a "popular consultation" on the comprehensive peace agreement to be signed by the SPLM/A and the government. Each state will establish a Parliamentary Assessment and Evaluation Commission and a separate Independent Commission to evaluate the implementation of the peace agreement. If the agreement is endorsed by the legislature in each state, it will become "the final settlement" of the political conflict there. If the agreement is not being fully implemented, negotiations will be held with the National Government to rectify the shortcomings. A state executive will consist of a state governor, a state council of ministers and local government in each state. A state legislature will prepare and adopt a constitution in each, and may relieve the governor of the state of his/her functions. Both institutions will be represented 55 percent by the National Congress Party, and 45 percent by the SPLM. The governorship will rotate in each state between both sides.

It is feared that such peace deal will face some problems when it comes to implementation. Some observers have already warned of this bilateral agreement. The Norwegian Minister of Development, Hilde Johnson, warned that many groups across Sudan feel excluded from the peace process and she said, "It is precondition for lasting peace that the peace process includes all people, including civil societies, political parties and other political forces". What appear from this peace deal that the winners from this agreement are the National Congress Party and the SPLM/A whereas the Nuba, Southern blue Nile and other marginalised groups are the losers.

 The Nuba Issue

The Agreement denied the Nuba the right to self-determination which is one of their main demands. The Nuba, in "All Nuba Conference" held in Kauda in December 2002 gave the SPLM/A Chairman, Dr. John Garang a mandate to negotiation on their behalf in IGAD. However, it was clear that the Nuba issue was traded away. In other word a compromise was made at their expense to reach a settlement on Abyei conflict resolution and by giving the National Congress Party an in built majority of 55% representation in the proposed Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains government and the SPLM (45%) representation, there is zero representation of Nuba political parties, civil society and community leaders.

We believe that this peace deal is purely designed to prevent the Nuba from having a say or control over their region. The Government has its agendas for the Nuba Mountains and among these the imposition of Sharia, elimination of Nuba cultural identity and ensuring that they will not have the power or strong say over the region. This of course will have a profound implication on the political future of the Nuba in Sudan.

The "Popular consultation" proposed in the Protocol to resolve the conflict in the Nuba Mountains is an ambiguous and is misleading term. It does not give the Nuba the right to exercise self-determination if the country is divided at the end of the six years interim period. Naivasha Agreement had clearly denied the Nuba and people of Southern Blue Nile the fundamental human right of self-determination for which they have an irrefutable claim. To ask the two regions to evaluate the Agreement after four years of signing will be only for cosmetic exercise, as we believe nothing will change the mind of this government to accept the basic rights of the Nuba and others. They could change only through the use of force and amounting pressure by international community as was in the case of southern Sudan.

The Nuba since independence have suffered marginalisation, discrimination and exploitations from all governments which seized power in Khartoum since independence. In recent years they have suffered the "Jihad War" and experienced the horrors of ethnic cleansing and starvation. What are the guarantees that they will not face the same abuses under the same government in the Northern Sudan?

In our view the Naivasha Agreement is a setback for the Nuba cause. As the Nuba will face political upheaval and uncertainty, particularly if the people of the Southern Sudan voted at the end of six years interim period to opt for independent South State. In this case what will happen to the 45% share of SPLM/A given by the Agreement. The Nuba for many years and during their long struggle alongside the SPLA have been demanding the right of self-determination and absolute self-rule. Many Nuba still can’t believe that the SPLA Leadership had let them down. "I want to reiterate the commitment of the SPLM/A to these areas. We will not let you down. Whatever agreement we reach in IGAD we’ll include you," said Dr John Garang, addressing All Nuba Conference in Kauda, December 2002. But the Nuba demands had not been met in this peace Resolution of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains Conflict.

In conclusion, there is still a window of opportunity for the Parties to put things right and make the Agreement which is to be reached next August more attractive and acceptable to all Sudanese people. The current unfolding crisis in Darfur put more pressure on the Parties to conclude a just and lasting peace that will embrace every body, including the people of Darfur. It is important that the Parties should learn from the past experience and not to repeat the same mistakes which were committed prior to our independence in 1956. We need peace that is built on justice, democracy, respect for human rights and freedom of expression and not a "desolate peace" that of Roman style.

Suleiman Musa Rahhal