At last and after many years of peace negotiations under the auspices of Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) signed a final peace agreement in Nairobi on 9th January 2005. This Accord is supposed to end the longest war in the African content, which started in August 1955 and caused the loss of about two million human lives and twice that number of people made displaced. This historical Accord was signed in a big ceremony held in Nairobi and witnessed by eminent representatives from countries in Africa, Europe and USA and also witnessed by international bodies including, the United Nations, European Commission and the Arab League. This means that the Parties to the agreement should adhere seriously and commit themselves to its implementation. It is fair to say that the Navaisha agreement has brought an end to the long, bitter war between the North and the South. However, the question remains, can this agreement bring a comprehensive peace settlement to the whole of the country? Such a complex agreement, which contains many resolutions including those on power-sharing, wealth-sharing, security arrangements, the resolution for three central areas of Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei, and self-determination for the people of the Southern Sudan, will obviously need more than goodwill to succeed. Adhering to and implementing the agreement will be a big challenge for the Parties.

Many of the signatories to the agreement delivered great words of optimism and said that the Accord is a first step for stability in Sudan. Dr John Garang leader of SPLM/A said, "This peace agreement has changed Sudan. Sudan shall not and will never be the same again." He went on to say, "The Government of national unity will be put in place in a few weeks". Ali Osman Taha, the Vice President said, "There is no time to be wasted nor effort to be spared in implementing the agreement". It is true that the signing of the accord is only the first step and many hurdles will need to be overcome before a real peace is achieved. Among these hurdles is to convince the majority of Sudanese people that this agreement belongs to them and that they will play a role, through participation in decision making particularly, in the drawing up of the constitution prior to the formation of broad base national government. Inclusiveness at this stage is paramount otherwise there will be little support for the implementation process.

The majority of the Sudanese people have been excluded from the peace process and from the Naivasha agreement to the extent that many began to ask the question, "Who's peace is this? Is this peace only for National Congress Party and SPLM?" The lack of inclusion and the denial of others in the shaping of the future of their country and most importantly in participating in the writing of the country's constitution could lead to some problems as many political forces are now voicing their concerns. Their resentment is based on the fact that neither the National Congress Party nor the SPLM represent the majority of the people in the Sudan. Therefore, they do not have the right to decide the future of the country alone. Ostensibly, the National Congress Party represents only 5% of the total population of the Sudan; hence it cannot represent the whole of the Northern populations. This is also applied to Sudan's People Liberation Army (SPLM) which does not represent the whole of the peoples of Southern Sudan. It is for this reason many political parties are sceptical and very reluctant to support the agreement.

It is difficult at this stage to predict the outcome of the agreement and the future of the country when the very peace agreement which is supposed to end injustices and grievances in the country, has been reached through a process which failed to include many key stakeholders. The persistent denial of others' rights to participate in the peace process and to be fairly represented in the constitution commission will make it impossible for the majority to adhere to the agreement.

Sudan in its long history has never experienced true democracy and it will be a long time before Sudanese people see any kind of democracy such as that of Westminster style democracy in Sudan, and certainly not under the NIF regime. To ensure this the negotiating parties undemocratically ignored the views and the aspirations of the majority of people in Sudan. Many observers believe that the National Congress Party will continue to consolidate its power while the SPLM will concentrate on preparing the people of Southern Sudan for the new Southern state and there will be no serious investment made to embrace everybody and unify the country. The South during the interim period will have its own government, army, flag, its own bank and currency and it is only a matter of time before a new nation is born in the southern part of the country.

The Naivasha agreement has marginalized the people of the Nuba Mountains in terms of power-sharing, wealth-sharing and other issues. The agreement has denied them the right to self-determination and absolute self-rule which the people of the Nuba Mountains demanded. A compromised deal was done between the two parties to reach a final peace agreement at the expense of Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile. The agreement gives the National Congress Party 55% and the SPLM 45% of power in the regional government of Nuba Mountains /Southern Kordofan. This division of power and resources between the National Congress Party and the SPLM excluding the people of Nuba Mountains and others will have an adverse effect on the implementation. The Nuba fear that if the people of the South opt for secession at the referendum they could claim 45% of the Nuba territory, ie that which the Naivasha agreement has given the SPLM/A control over. Any such division of the Nuba Mountains territory between the Northern state and Southern state will have devastating consequences and could result in the Nuba Mountains becoming another "Kashmir". The Government's in-built 55% majority in the regional government will give them the right to have overall control of 55% of the Nuba Mountains territory and pass any legislation that will suppress the Nuba and undermine them. The Government has already favoured the Messeirya Arab tribes living in Western Kordofan in the agreement by given them 2% of oil revenues and 2% of power. It is for this reason important that the people of the Nuba Mountains should be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination if the people of Southern Sudan decided to separate and form their own state.

How can a peace agreement succeed if it excludes the basic rights of the very groups whose participation is essential to create a workable and inclusive settlement to the conflict in the Sudan? The people of the Nuba Mountains live in the geographical centre of the country and are also central to the conflict between North and the South. Any north- south division will have serious implications on the Nuba if they are not given the right of self-determination to decide their destiny. And there are clear indications that the people of Southern Sudan are poised to vote at the referendum for separation.

The agreement has diminished the chances of Nuba political aspirations being realised by amalgamating the Nuba Mountains region with the Western Kordofan state which has dense Baggara Arab population loyal to the Northern government. This amalgamation is a deliberate process of assimilation and elimination of the Nuba and their cultural identity. The government policy towards the Nuba Mountains is clear and for this reason it insists on having 55% of power in the regional government of Southern Kordofan/ Nuba Mountains with the ill- intention of giving more power to its loyal Arab tribes in Western Kordofan. The Government succeeded at the Naivasha peace process in changing the historical name of "Nuba Mountains" to "Southern Kordofan"; and the downgrading of Kadugli, the capital of Nuba Mountains by shifting some of its administration to Rejel-Alfula in western Kordofan which has recently been given development assistance for this purpose.

Nuba and the Baggara Arab tribes who migrated with their cattle to the Nuba Mountains region were living side by side in relative peace for many generations, after they have resolved their disputes. And over the years relation between the two communities developed into mutual trust, with inter-marriages and cultural exchanges. However, due to the central government policy towards the Nuba this peaceful co-existence suddenly developed into a brutal conflict, as the present government in Khartoum set the Baggara Arab tribes against their neighbour. But the Messeriyia Arabs later realized that the Khartoum government has used them in their war against the Nuba and they came seeking to make peace with their neighbour, realizing that their interests lie with the Nuba and not with Khartoum.

It is clear from Naivasha Peace Agreement that the government had worked extremely hard to change the historical name of Nuba Mountains which is to be replaced by Southern Kordofan. This is to please the Messeriyia as they intend to use them again against the Nuba. It has given them much power in the proposed regional government of Southern Kordufan plus 2% of oil revenue stipulated in the agreement for the Messeriyia and nothing clearly given to the Nuba Mountains region which has been severely affected by the civil war.

By so doing the government intends to put the control of the region into the hands of Messeriyia, at the same time weakening and marginalising the Nuba in their own homeland. The amalgamation of the two regions is a deliberate act which has a political agenda similar to that used in Darfur. This kind of state policy is based on a "divide and rule and favouritism". This will only encourage violence and hinder any prospect for permanent peace in Sudan.

Suleiman Musa Rahhal