Sudan: The Peace Between the Pieces

Published in New African Magazine March 2005

Following the recently signed Naivasha peace accord between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), Rocco Blume looks at what this agreement offers to the rest of Sudan's political parties, opposition movements, civil society groups and armed factions.

Witnessing the celebratory euphoria at the Naivasha peace agreement ceremony in Nairobi it became clear that many might have doubted this day would ever come. In an unprecedented show of cooperation and after so many previously failed attempts at securing a peace agreement, pen was put to paper by Vice President Ali Osman Taha and SPLA leader Dr John Garang on the 9th January at a ceremony attended by a host of international statesmen including US Secretary of State Colin Powell and assorted regional Presidents.

However, despite this rush of optimism, many of Sudan's other conflicts roll on unabated. With the international community still paralysed at the horror of Darfur, the brutal suppression of civilian protests in the east, and continuing uncertainty in the south, many Sudanese people are asking 'what can this peace process bring for us?' This is especially felt in Sudan's peripheral regions where, many hundreds of miles from Khartoum, communities have for decades complained of marginalisation from decision-making, unaddressed poverty and neglect.

For many in east, west and southern Sudan the Naivasha peace agreement is yet another political process from which they have been shut out. The National Islamic Front government is estimated to represent only 5% of the population, and the SPLA although popular in the south for leading the resistance, has never had its support base measured by any popular test. Hence this is widely seen as an agreement of two minorities. According to veteran Southern Sudanese leader and former Minister, Bona Malwal, this situation brings echoes of the last implemented peace agreement 30 years ago:

"The 1972 Addis Ababa agreement failed because the two parties thought they owned it. It was not seen as the property of the country. Unfortunately in Sudan and in all Africa, individuals who find themselves in power behave as if they own the country and what they decide is what should go. You will find that many parties that have been excluded from the Naivasha agreement for this reason will then be opposed to the agreement and opposition grows sooner rather than later and it undermines the agreement itself."

The critical issue at the heart of the Naivasha agreement is self-determination for southern Sudan i.e. that the people of the southern region will be given the opportunity to vote in a referendum to stay united with or become independent from the rest of Sudan. Although at first glance self-determination may appear an exclusively southern issue, it is a truly national concern. For politicians like Salah Jakeen, spokesman of the Beja Congress the issue is critical;

"Once the south separates many other regions will also move to breakaway. If you drop a plate it does not break into two pieces! Sudan is more than north and south. The separation of the south will set a precedent."

Indeed the lesson that other regions may take from the decades of Southern struggle is that armed resistance may eventually pay off, despite the terrible cost. Both the Eastern Beja Congress and Darfurian Justice and Equality Movement are demanding a federal Sudan but their futures are inextricably linked to developments in the south. The national and international recognition of the legitimacy of southern Sudanese demands for self-determination have opened the possibility to other regions that they can also attain recognition.

The Naivasha agreement promises a six-year interim period in which southern Sudan will be governed by a region administration. According to Bona Malwal actions speak louder than words, and the interim period is the last opportunity for pro-unity politicians to prove that a united Sudan is a viable option.

"Nothing that can be said in 6 years that will make a difference but there is a lot that can be done in 6 years that can make a difference. If I see a new behaviour and attitude then I will know that a lesson has been learned from the past. Equality can be achieved in 6 months if people are serious about it, with an immediate programme of action. People don't ask for independence in order to raise a flag people want to be in charge of there own affairs."

Ever since the beginning of the most recent phase of peace negotiations an oft repeated criticism made by Sudanese outside the talks was that the two parties (the NIF and SPLA) simply did not represent the vast majority of Sudanese and hence the agreement would soon come undone. This point was not lost on the international sponsors of the peace deal, notably the US government, who have argued that a small exclusive process would secure a deal sooner and could later be widened to include more diverse voices. More sceptical observers have highlighted Washington's more self-serving need to swiftly 'capture a rare foreign policy victory that could offset growing doubts about Iraq at home', a feat eminently more achievable under the Naivasha model.

Given that the Naivasha accord is exclusively focused on settling grievances between north and south Sudan the issue of exclusion from the process is felt keenly in the south itself where besides the SPLA, seventeen other armed groups exist representing a variety of political aspirations and many ethnic identities. Common to most Southern Sudanese is a desire for out-right independence from the North, an aspiration at odds with the SPLA policy of a united federal Sudan.

Of those excluded from the peace process are an increasingly organised body of southerners in civil society, political and armed groupings that have gathered together in a coalition called the South Sudan Democratic Forum. Both the SPLA and the Democratic Forum speak positively of the need for South-South dialogue (discussion and consensus building between southern Sudanese), yet it is the modus operandi of such a dialogue remains contested. The Democratic Forum members fear being co-opted and losing their voice and influence if they are absorbed into the SPLA structure and hence are demanding a dialogue of equals with a view to partnership and possible merger.

Speaking in London the SPLA representative Deng Yai put the SPLA view:

The SPLA is keen to listen to grievances and concerns and take them on board, to reach political settlement with other groups with a view to them joining the SPLM and become one. This is what we did with the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) of Dr Riek Machar, SPLM-United faction of Dr Lam Akol, and other groups. We would like to be inclusive, to bring in and involve any group that feels excluded. Hence we are talking with the Democratic Forum. Obviously dialogue will continue with a view to consolidate unity with people who are opposed to SPLA."

However the Democratic Forum members including some of the most eminent exiled Southern Sudanese leaders are not willing to, as they see it, become subordinates in a powerful and centralised single party system. Challenging the SPLA claim to pre-eminence Democratic Forum President Martin Lomoru declared:

The SPLA does not militarily control the whole of the south and therefore they would have no legitimacy to enter territories that are not controlled by them. Therefore the peace process is in danger. And hence we are calling for South-South dialogue to bring harmony and even merger between the SPLA and the SSDF, to form an army that belongs to the south. And politically those organisations outside the peace process need to begin a dialogue with the SPLA, to share power and to ensure that we all guide the peace process until the people exercise the right o self-determination."

Given that much of the peace agreement focuses on the sharing of oil wealth the security of the oil fields remains paramount. It was surely fresh in the minds of the negotiators in Naivasha that in-fighting between Nuer in the oilfields (backed by the NIF and SPLA) and the ensuing pressure from international human rights lobby drove out Swedish and Canadian Oil companies in the last two years and caused massive displacement of the civilian population.

For those who are sceptical of the governments commitment to honour the agreed devolution of power to a southern administration and the eventual referendum on self-determination the stability of armed factions is of particular concern. The present NIF government have a long history of playing divide and rule with assorted militias opposed to the SPLA, openly funding such groups since 1997. According to long-time Sudan analyst John Ryle of the Rift Valley Institute;

"There are so many communities in the south and it is so easy to divide them. And perhaps the Government will continue its divide and rule strategy all be it in a less visible way. It's hard to imagine that they would abandon it particularly since it has stood them in such good stead elsewhere."

Whilst war and chaos reign in Darfur, little international media coverage has been given to the increasingly tense militarised situation in the Eastern states of Kassala and the Red Sea Hills that threatens to escalate if left unchecked.

As recently as 29th Jan 2005 up to 29 people were killed in a day of clashes between supporters of the Beja Congress Party and security forces in Port Sudan. The crowds had been calling for more power and resources to be invested in the region but were caught in a swift security clampdown. It appears that given the recent conclusion of the north-south peace agreement and the lack of international action on Darfur the government has been emboldened to stamp out any hint of subversion or opposition at first sight.

The non-Arab Beja tribes north eastern Sudan have long complained of central government neglect and marginalisation that has led to dire regional poverty. In the early 1960s the Beja Congress movement was formed to articulate these grievances but frustrated by lack of progress began an armed struggle in the early 1990s. Through out the 90s this Beja Congress front along the Eritrean border was reinforced with a large contingent of SPLA troops sent up from Southern Sudan and received support as a member of he National Democratic Alliance (NDA) the umbrella opposition organisation grouping.

Traditionally the Eastern region has been the heartland of the Democratic Union Party headed by Osman Mirghani current head of the Khatimiya Muslim sect founded by his ancestors in the 19th century and the latest scion of influential Mirghani family. However, since the early 1990s when the NIF government in Khartoum began to aggressively promote its version of Islam in the region, launching attacks on Beja Mosques and religious schools, the grass roots based Beja Congress found popular support for leading its armed resistance.

According to former Vice-President Joseph Lagu the development of such grassroots movements was historically inevitable.

"People have seen how southern Sudan struggle as a region to have its voice heard and now they are having to do the same. Those taking up arms in Darfur and now in the East are now forces to be reckoned with and they are eroding the power of the traditional party. It is the influence of advancement. In Europe many years back the church leaders used to wield tremendous powers but as people become more advanced they begin to question these powers and distance themselves."

In mid-January 2004 the Darfur based Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) forged an alliance with the Beja Congress. Issuing a joint statement both parties declared they would " continue their struggle together until they got rid of marginalisation, poverty, ignorance and backwardness". Significantly both groups are fighting for similar objectives i.e. of some form of federal arrangement where local people can govern themselves with out central Khartoum interference and domination.

As with the war in Darfur, the development of this eastern conflict is inextricably linked to the fate of the North-South peace process. Already there are fears that the redeployment of government troops away from the former southern war zone and the simultaneous movement of SPLA troops from the Eastern border area will strengthen the governments eastern front and signal an renewed offensive against the Beja Congress fighters on the Eastern border with Eritrea. In light of the massacre of protesters in Port Sudan the Beja Congress is speaking in increasingly militant tones about the willingness 'fight fire with fire' if necessary. At a recent emergency conference called in London following the events in Port Sudan, Beja Congress leaders called for a nation wide civilian intifada against the government.

Most significantly the Beja are practically voiceless with no forum in which to present their political demands to the government. Both exclusion from direct involvement in the Naivasha negotiations, and disenchanted with the platform offered by the DUP dominated National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the Beja are left with few options.

According to the influential London-based lobbying group Justice Africa:

"Any military activity in Eastern Sudan would be a disaster for the Sudanese peace process and for the people who live in the area. It should be avoided. All Sudanese parties should commit in advance to a peaceful settlement of the grievances of the people of Eastern Sudan, including if necessary a separate forum for their discussion and settlement."